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In this paper optimal currency arrangements in Asia-Pacific region are analyzed from the
viewpoint of stabilizing output given various random shocks. In terms of how the potential
arrangements may insulate individual economies from external and shocks, the proposed cur-
rency union in Asia-Pacific did not yet gain strong support. It is generally agreed that its
only advantage is to smooth the effect of local real shocks on the combined stability of in-
volved economies. The status quo regime of continued floating exchange rates among those
countries is regarded as the most feasible defense against real internal shocks and may be re-
garded as offering similar advantages with respect to external monetary shocks. On the other
hand, using yen as anchor currency (hypothetical yennization) may be the best defense against
real external shocks and internal monetary shocks.
INTRODUCTION
There is a new determination to map the road to closer monetary cooperation as a building
bloc for eventual monetary union in Asia-Pacific. In this study we analytically assess the suit-
ability of the Asian-Pacific economies for potential monetary integration, on the basis of their
symmetry/asymmetry in macroeconomic disturbances (monetary and real shocks), as satisfying
one of the preconditions for forming an optimum currency area.
Asian currency crisis (1997–1999) gave impetus for an important debate under way on the
appropriate exchange rate regime for economies in Asia. At the end of September 1997,
Japan proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). The largest part of the
national contributions to the AMF would come from Japan, but also Hong Kong, Taiwan and
Singapore were prepared to contribute, and it was envisaged to reach a total of 100 billion US
dollars. In spite of support from the Asian countries, the Japanese proposal was blocked by
the adverse reactions from the USA and from the IMF. A compromise was sought in the
so-called Manila Framework, with a financing agreement that would supplement the IMF
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financing, but without the institutional component of the AMF. This Framework was
developed by the Manila Framework Group in November 1997, which consists of 14 Asia-
Pacific nations.
On May 6, 2000, during a meeting of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers, it was agreed to
extend the ASEAN Swap Arrangement to all ASEAN member countries (ASEAN-10) and to
China, Japan and South Korea. This agreement is known as the Chiang Mai Initiative
(CMI)and it consists of a network of bilateral swap agreements (BSA) between the 13
countries. It should be noted however, that the amount of allocated swap funds was insuffi-
cient to cope with any potential major financial crisis in the future. Moreover, the use of the
currencies of the countries involved in bilateral trade was seriously hampered since the BSA is
only adopted by four ASEAN countries, whereas international traders prefer to use the dollar.
The CMI is also more complex than the BSA, due to the multitude of sometimes diverging
provisions in the bilateral agreements. Also in order not to get the same adverse reaction from
the USA and the IMF, the BSA is complementary to the IMF, as it was agreed with IMF that at
most 10 percent. of a bilateral swap could be done without any link to the IMF, which evi-
dently severely limits the efficiency of the BSA both in terms of timing and conditions attached
to support. However, by doing so, the total amount which can be made available for support
within ASEAN+3 by the BSA and the IMF is 10 billion US dollars. In June 2003, the central
banks of Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (the eleven members of the Executive’s
Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks) announced the establishment of the Asian Bond
Fund (ABF). It aims at managing a fund of approximately 1 billion US dollars, which will
come from Asian and Pacific countries, and invest this fund in a basket of liquid dollar
denominated Asian government bonds. The Bank for International Settlements’s investment
management unit, BIS Asset Management, will manage the ABF with teams based in its Repre-
sentative Office for Asia and the Pacific and in the BIS head office. The ABF will facilitate
the re-investment of a small portion of Asia’s international reserves back into the region while
at the same time aiding the development of regional capital markets.
The debate on monetary union has been accentuated not only by the Asian currency crisis
but also by a perceived increase in volatility in the world economy. On the one side there are
calls for maintaining floating exchange rates (Mussa (2000), while of the other, there are
various forms of fixed exchange rate regimes being proposed (McKinnon (2000)), (Williamson
(2000)). These range from a Yen bloc and Yuan-bloc to an Asian currency unit (ACU)
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(Ogawa and Ito (2000)), or to various forms of basket pegs within each economy.
The issue whether groups and sub-groups of Asian countries could establish a common
currency, is much debated in the academic literature, especially since the 1997 crisis, but in
spite of some initiatives within ASEAN, hardly of relevance in actual regional politics. The
academic discussion is intimately related to the question which, if any, countries in Asia can be
considered as a group as an optimal currency area (OCA). Optimum currency area (OCA)
theory is the mainstream theoretical framework for analyzing the structural economic factors
that determine the net (positive or negative) effect of forming a currency area among countries.
Empirical tests based on OCA theory are therefore a good starting point for evaluating the
objective economic conditions for monetary integration in Asia-Pacific. Although in the short
run, political considerations, alongside other economic circumstances, might well condition or
even impose exchange rate choices, OCA theory is particularly relevant in the medium and
long run. The predictive power of OCA theory has been empirically demonstrated by authors
like Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) and Papaioannou (2003). However, Cohen (1998) and
others emphasize that the presence of a dominant economy committed to monetary integration
and the presence of a network of trade and capital market linkages that make the cost of a inter-
dependent monetary policy acceptable to all members are also two conditions sine qua non for
successful monetary integration.
The empirical tests of the OCA conditions that are available for Asia Pacific Asia give a
mixed picture. They do not provide a clear cut answer with regard to the course of an optimal
exchange rate policies and, possibly, the formation of currency unions in the region in the near
or farther future. According to Bayoumi and Mauro (1999), and Ng (2002), indicators of the
degree of shock symmetry show that ASEAN members are less suited than those of the EU, a
few years before the Maastricht Treaty, for forming a currency union as a deeper economic
integration and a firm political commitment in the region are necessary pre-conditions.
According to Ng, shocks in Southeast Asia are more strongly correlated than in the EU and
external shocks are more strongly correlated than in NAFTA. Indonesia, Singapore and
Malaysia show a relatively high degree of correlation of shocks. According to Cohen (2003),
the lack of political integration and solidarity, necessary to sustain the needed degree of com-
mitment, is the main obstacle to monetary integration. Sterner and Skoog (2003) analyze the
degrees of openness, the degrees of product diversification, similarities of industrial structure,
similarities of inflation rates, degrees of correlation of macro-economic variables for ASEAN-
10. According to other studies – ASEAN does not appear to constitute a suitable ground for
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the OCA. See Lafrance and St-Amant (1999), Mongelli (2002) or Horvath(2003).
Interestingly, the arguments on both sides of the debate are familiar from earlier debates
going at least back to the “optimal currency area” literature originated by Mundell (1961). It
is well known that it is difficult to make much headway on deciding which exchange rate
regime a country should adopt without an empirical evaluation of the various alternatives.
From the theory of exchange rate regimes, we conclude that the optimal exchange rate regime
depends on a range of empirical features of economies (both the economic structure and the
nature of shocks). The large body of evidence in Bryant et al (1993) for industrial economies
demonstrates that not only is the theoretical choice of the optimal exchange rate regime
ambiguous, but different empirical approaches generate different conclusions for the developed
economies .
In the case of Asia-Pacific region, there has been little empirical research into the
important questions of comparing the performance of different exchange regimes in an
empirical framework. For example, Cheung and Yuen (2004) found evidence on synchronous
output movements in the long run and common business cycles in China, Japan and Korea.
According to these authors, the formation of a currency union in Northeast Asia would have
net positive effects for the participating countries. They point however to a number of
complications related to the implementation of such a currency union, such as the role of a
regional dominant economy and the difference in development levels between its members, and
the consequences for the macro-economic adjustment process. More empirical studies take a
wider set of countries, comprising both East Asian countries and ASEAN member countries, as
a starting point. Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1996), for example, conclude that East Asia
satisfies the standard OCA criteria perhaps in higher degree than EU countries. As arguments
against monetary integration, they see the lack of development of the domestic financial
systems, and the lack of institutions and political will at the regional level. Similar
methodologies but different variables and data sets are used by Yuen (2000), Trivisvanet
(2001), Zhang et al. (2002) and Saxena (2003). Starting from a set of countries including
ASEAN-5, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Australia and New Zealand, Yuen
(2000) proposes a multi-speed strategy towards monetary integration.
Three sub-regional monetary unions could be formed in an initial phase: Japan/Korea,
Taiwan/Hong Kong/China and Singapore/Malaysia/Brunei/Indonesia. Other countries could
then join one of these unions, which could finally be integrated in a wider Asian monetary
union. Trivisvavet (2001) considers a slightly reduced set with ASEAN-5, Japan, Korea and
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Hong Kong as this group has characteristics of an OCA. An optimal scenario with gradualism
would imply that the Southeast Asian countries, with the exception of Indonesia but possibly
including Korea, form a monetary union, after which the other countries could join
later. Zhang et al. (2002) find that the structural shocks affecting ASEAN-5, US, Japan,
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and China are less symmetric and have a larger size on average,
compared to the EU, although the adjustment speed is faster. It is not excluded however that
smaller subsets of countries might engage in processes of monetary integration. Saxena
(2003), finally, finds that most of the countries comprised by ASEAN, Japan, Korea, China and
India show positive correlations for supply disturbances and high labour mobility.
The countries concerned could also form a currency union around the yen, on the condi-
tion that the Yen-Dollar exchange rate can be stabilised. Goto (2003) uses principal compo-
nent analysis of seven macro-economic variables for Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Japan. A relatively high degree of synchronization with Japanese
variables is observed, which has dramatically increased since the 1990s. Indonesia, Korea,
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand might consider to form a monetary union around Ja-
pan.
It is conventionally assumed that the most compelling reason in favor of a common
currency is the elimination of transaction costs and exchange risks. The stability of money
could in turn promote intra-regional trade and investment flows. While a common currency
delivers benefits to the participating economies, it also imposes costs, in particular, the loss of
monetary autonomy in response to asymmetric country shocks. Thus, an important empirical
question is the extent to which Asia-Pacific is a region where country specific (idiosyncratic)
shocks predominate, or whether it is a region where shocks affect all countries in a fairly
similar way.
Some economists are highly critical about the scope for a common currency arrangements
in Asia-Pacific. Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999), Bayoumi and Mauro (1999), Bayoumi,
Eichengreen and Mauro (1999) and Mussa et al. (2000), for example, are dismissive of such
arrangements in this region, particularly of the feasibility of monetary union. Similar
methodologies but different variables and data sets are used by Yuen (2000), Trivisvanet
(2001), Zhang et al. (2002) and Saxena (2003). On the other hand, Japanese economists
appear less critical Goto and Hamada (1994); Ito, Ogawa and Sasaki (1998); Murase (2000);
Ogawa and Ito (2000); Ogawa (2000); Kawai and Akiyama (2000); Kawai and Takagi
(2000);Yoshino, Kaji and Suzuki (2000).
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Since the end of Asian currency crisis there is a renewed focus on regional integration in
trade and investment in the region. Under the umbrella of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation’s
(APEC) Bogor declarations of an open trading and investment regime by 2010/20, there have
been substantial developments in sub-regional integration and a number of proposals for free
trade areas. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) is now established and the Australia New
Zealand Closer Economic Relationship (CER) is well advanced. Proposals for new free trade
areas range from bilateral free trade areas – such as between Japan and Korea, Japan and
Singapore, and New Zealand and Singapore – to larger free trade areas such as that between
AFTA and CER. Japan proposed a collaboration agreement with ASEAN in 2002. The
“Framework Agreement for Comprehensive Economic Partnership” between ASEAN and
Japan was signed in October 2003 in Bali, Indonesia.
It is important to note that before its 2002 proposal, Japan seemed more inclined to follow
the route of bilateral agreements. A bilateral agreement with Singapore had been signed in
January 2002. Japan also integrated its bilateral agreements with the Framework Agreement
for Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEP). Negotiations about the specific articles in
the CEP Agreement started in April 2005 and will be concluded in two years. Some ASEAN
members are frustrated with ASEAN’s slowness in building free trade frameworks and have
been pursuing bilateral trade agreements during the last couple of years. Current situation
seems to reflect the enormous gap that exists within ASEAN, between members wanting to
negotiate collectively (using the ASEAN or the ASEAN+3 framework) and other members
aiming at quicker progress and thus switching to bilateral trade agreements. The more
developed members, such as Thailand and Singapore, already are relatively open economies
and they expected that ASEAN (AFTA) could enhance their global competitive position
through further specialization and increased FDI inflows. Other less developed countries
prefer enhancing intra-ASEAN trade and closing the development gap within ASEAN. These
less developed member countries still block the introduction of a “national treatment” rule for
foreign investment. There is also policy dialogue on economic cooperation between ASEAN,
Japan, Korea and China.
The actual policy debate on common currency arrangements has also changed substan-
tially. In 1990s, many experts noted the reluctance of Japan to take a positive stance towards
the formation of a yen bloc in east Asia, partly because of a desire to limit the internationaliza-
tion of the yen and partly because of concerns that such a policy may be perceived as a second
attempt at an Asian co-prosperity area (Frankel 1991; Goto and Hamada 1994). While Japan
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is concious of regional opposition to its economic dominant position in the region – it is more
relaxed in promoting wide-ranging and public discussion of new financial and currency
arrangements in the region (Sakakibara 1999; Kuroda 2000). In this, it seems to have some
support from within the region, as shown by the public comments in support of an Asian
currency unit by the Philippines President Gloria Arrojo, premier B.G Lee of Singapore and
Australian PM Howard.
A. MAJOR CURRENCY PEG
Consideration of common currency arrangements has been stimulated by the successful
introduction of monetary union in Europe, and a concern that the fluctuation of the exchange
rates in the 1990s played some part in causing Asia’s currency crisis in 1997. There is also a
sense that Japan’s prestige as an economic power is on the line unless it becomes the centre of
a regional currency arrangement, in the same way as the United States is to the western
hemisphere (dominant economy), and Germany is to Europe (European locomotive of growth).
The proposals for common currency arrangements are mainly of two types. The first is the
formation of a currency area, with countries in the region pegging their currencies to a basket
of the yen, dollar and euro (Council on Foreign Exchange and Other Transactions 1999;
Kuroda 2000). The weights could be based on their own trade shares with Japan, the United
States and the European Union. Alternatively, they could be based on a regional average of
trade shares with Japan, the United States and the European Union (Dornbusch and Park 1999;
Williamson 1999; Murase 2000). It does not necessarily follow that in a common-basket peg
arrangement each country has to adopt a fixed exchange rate or surrender its own monetary
sovereignty, although in practice formation of a currency area does limit national policy
discretion, and probably to a substantial degree (Kenen 1997; Mussa, 1997).
Those economists who support a common-basket peg argue, that the exchange rate could
be fixed to the peg or it could move within a specified band around the peg, say 7–10 per cent
(Williamson 1999) or 15 per cent (Murase, 2000). This system would also be accompanied
by a regional fund to support currencies remaining within the band (Kuroda 2000; Murase,
2000), perhaps similar to the reserve credits provided by the Reserve Tranche in European
Monetary Cooperation Fund to support the exchange rate pegs of the European Monetary
System, established in 1979. Dornbusch and Park (1999) view a common-basket peg
arrangement as the end of the process. Murase (2000), however, sees it only as a first
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step. He argues that the common-basket peg should be converted at some stage to a regional
peg, called an Asian currency unit (ACU). This would entail countries in the region pegging
their currencies to a weighted average of regional convertible currencies, possibly with some
weight given to the dollar and euro but with primary weight given to the yen (see also
Sakakibara, 1999). The yen would be the de facto anchor currency of the region.
A common-basket peg is an important first step because it is seen as a way to increase the
correlation of regional currencies with the yen (Council on Foreign Exchange and Other
Transactions 1999; Murase 2000). From a non-Japanese perspective, Moon, Rhee and Yoon
(2000) argue for a regional currency unit in preference to a basket peg because they see the
former as more likely to engage a wider set of countries in regional currency and liquidity
Support arrangements, and hence more likely to alleviate fears of domination by Japan.
Moon, Rhee and Yoon (2000) envisage a target zone for an ACU maturing into a regional fixed
exchange rate system. For Murase (2000), the final stage is currency union, which is the
second type of common currency arrangement. This is admittedly a long-term objective.
Interestingly, the proposal for currency union is not that countries in the region formally adopt
the yen, but that a new currency be formed. This would imitate European monetary
union. From Japan’s perspective, as Germany was prepared to give up the mark for the euro,
so too will Japan give up the yen for a regional currency. This is also more acceptable to non-
Japan east Asia (Moon, Rhee and Yoon, 2000).
The available studies of the region varies geographically somewhat in the literature. In
this paper, the region under consideration includes 15 economies, including Australia,
Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan and Vietnam. It includes three of the new ASEAN
members and, as in the studies of Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) and Murase (2000),
Australia and New Zealand.
B COMMON-BASKET PEG
As an alternative to floating or pegging the exchange rate to one major currency, some
analysts have recommended that Asia-Pacific economies peg their currencies to a basket of the
dollar, euro and yen. Williamson (1999), Dornbusch and Park (1999) and Murase (2000)
support the view, that east Asia — or at least some part of it — should collectively peg their
currencies to a basket with common trade weights.
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This argument is based on two facts. The first is that over 40 percent of East Asia’s trade
is with itself (and 29 percent including Australia and New Zealand), substantially up from
about 20 percent two decades ago (and percent subsequently). This fact is used to support the
argument that intra-regional exchange rate stability is important for regional economic
stability. The second fact is that non-Japan East Asia has substantial trade not just with Japan
(about 14 percent of trade, including Australia and New Zealand 22 percent)), but also the
United States (about 14 percent (21 subsequently)) and the European Union (about 12 percent
(19 percent)). This is used to support the argument that Asian currencies need to be stabilized
against a basket of the three major currencies, and not just one of them.
With an emphasis on reducing intra-regional exchange rate volatility proponents of a
basket peg argue that the weights in the basket peg should be the common regional trade shares
with Japan, the United States and the European Union. Using a set of common weights
eliminates intra-regional exchange rate volatility, whereas using unilateral weights does
not. A basket peg needs to be robust to be viable. In the current environment of open
integrated and sophisticated financial markets and large and variable capital flows, it is
necessary that exchange rate regimes be sustainable and strong enough to absorb shocks and
speculation. Moreover, it follows that if a regional system of basket pegged exchange rates is
or becomes inconsistent with a member country’s domestic economic structure or policy
regime, it will be tested by domestic and external speculators.
Mainly due to the historical considerations, a common-basket peg would not be viable
without a strong political commitment on the part of Asia-pacific countries. To the extent that
outcomes under a common-basket peg conflict with national economic and policy interests, the
system is vulnerable to speculative attack. From that point of view Asia-Pacific would not
appear to be ready or an obvious candidate for a formal common-basket peg arrangement.
Alternative exchange rate regimes need to be compared to the system that is currently in
place. During the Asian currency crisis, most countries in the region abandoned implicit
pegging to the dollar and moved to managed floating (the only exception being Hong-Kong
dollar). As economies have recovered, the authorities in some countries have attempted to
contain the appreciation of their currencies relative to the US dollar. To the extent that this
marks a return to implicit dollar pegging, these countries may be recreating the very conditions
which led to the financial crisis in 1997. While formal pegging to a common basket may
not seem like a good idea for countries in Asia-Pacific, nor is implicit dollar pegging.
Williamson’s critique of implicit dollar pegging by Asian countries seems to be correct, even
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though his remedy needs to be subject to a good deal more careful scrutiny.
C CHOICE OF THE BEST CURRENCY REGIME FOR TWO COUNTRIES
Should these three options be considered unfeasible under current conditions – the other
option may be the establishment of bilateral currency arrangements ie to determine the best
currency regime for each or both of the two small/medium sized economies in this region.
The three policy options we may consider are:
(a) Two small/medium sized countries (For example Malaysia and Thailand) have a
fixed exchange rate between their currencies that floats against the Japanese yen (or US
dollar). With an immutable fixed exchange rate the two currencies act as a single currency.
This kind of monetary union is described in Grimes et al. (2000)
(b) Two countries have a flexible exchange rate between their currencies with each
floating against the yen or United States dollar. This is generally the status quo under present
arrangements in most countries of Asia-Pacific.
(c) Two countries each have a fixed exchange rate against the third country (for
example, Japanese yen) and therefore a fixed exchange rate between their two currencies.
The three currencies operate as a single currency. This is a modified proposal of the
yennization advanced as a possible option by Grimes et al. (2000).
This last proposal is substantially equivalent to yennization (two countries, say Malaysia
and Thailand using yen as their currency). Our discussion of this option ignores seigniorage
effects that would be important with strict yennization. These options are denoted below as
options (a), (b) and (c). In considering the selection of the optimum option we assume that
the objective behind choosing a currency arrangement is the promotion of the macroeconomic
stability of real output in the concerned countries. Given the existing closer economic
relations agreements between Malaysia and Thailand, Singapore and Brunei, Hong-Kong and
China, Australia and New Zealand it may be that these countries are interested in maximizing
the joint stability of aggregate output across both economies rather than the independent
stability of output in each of the two economies (this is referred in literature as an independent
stability objective).
The sine qua non condition for countries to use the same currency is that their economies
have similar structure and adjustment processes. An independent exchange rate provides a
country with a means to adjust relative prices as its economic circumstances change. If eco-
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nomic structures and systems between countries are similar, and if other adjustment processes
within this set of countries are flexible and efficient, then the need for each country to have its
own exchange rate are less strong (Mundell, 1961). The similarity in structure includes for-
eign trade, industry and financial system, as well as common policy structures (Haberler,
1966), including the need for some form of fiscal transfer to redistribute or compensate for dif-
ferences in unemployment between countries in a common currency bloc (McKinnon, 1963;
Kenen, 1969).
The experiences of European Union with euro seem to suggest that common currency
arrangements themselves tend to make countries’ structures and policies more similar
(Scitovsky, 1958; Frankel and Rose 1998). If non-monetary adjustment processes in an
economy work quickly and efficiently, the need for an independent currency is also less
obvious. One aspect that features prominently in the analysis is factor mobility. The more
mobile labor is within a region, and the less mobile it is between regions, the more appropriate
it is to fix the exchange rate and adopt a common currency within the region (Mundell, 1961).
Another factor is price flexibility. The more flexible and responsive are domestic cost and
price structures to adverse shocks, the less costly is adjustment in the real side of the economy,
and the less obvious is the need for the country to have an independent currency (McKinnon,
1963). This view is strongly emphasized by the recommendations of the G-Cubed Asia-
Pacific currency model
THE ASIA PACIFIC MODEL
The (Asia Pacific) multi-country model is based on the G-Cubed model developed in
McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998). It combines the intertemporal macroeconomic approach
taken in the MSG2 model of McKibbin and Sachs (1991) with the disaggregated, econo-
metrically-estimated, intertemporal general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy by
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1989). The model was constructed to contribute to the current
policy debate on global warming, trade policy and international capital flows, but it has many
features that make it useful for answering a range of issues in monetary integration and macro-
economic questions. It is a world model with substantial regional disaggregation and sectoral
detail. In addition, countries and regions are linked both temporally and intertemporally
through trade and financial markets.
The model contains a strong foundation for analysis of both short run macroeconomic
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policy analysis as well as long run growth consideration of alternative macroeconomic
policies. Intertemporal budget constraints on households, governments and nations (the latter
through accumulations of foreign debt) are imposed. To accommodate these constraints,
forward looking behavior is incorporated in consumption and investment decisions. Unlike
the MSG2model, the model also contains substantial sectoral detail. This permits analysis of
environmental and trade policies which tend to have their largest effects on small segments of
the economy. By integrating sectoral detail with the macroeconomic features of the MSG2
model, it can be used to consider the long run costs of alternative environmental regulations
and trade policy changes yet at the same time consider the macroeconomic implications
of these policies over time. The response of monetary and fiscal authorities in different
countries can have important effects in the short to medium run which, given the long lags in
physical capital and other asset accumulation, can be a substantial period of time. Overall, the
model is designed to provide a bridge between computable general equilibrium models and
macroeconomic models by integrating the more desirable features of both approaches.
The key features of the (Asia Pacific) model are summarized in table 1. The model con-
sists of eighteen economic regions with six sectors in each region (there are also two additional
sectors ineach region that produce the capital good for firms and the household capital
Table 1 Summary of Key Features of the Asia Pacific Model
(1) Specification of the demand and supply sides of economies;
(2) Integration of real and financial markets of these economies with explicit arbitrage
linkage realand financial rates of return;
(3) Intertemporal accounting of stocks and flows of real resources and financial assets;
(4) Imposition of intertemporal budget constraints so that agents and countries cannot
forever borrow or lend without undertaking the required resource transfers necessary to
service outstanding liabilities;
(5) Short run behavior is a weighted average of neoclassical optimizing behavior based on
expected future income streams and Keynesian current income;
(6) The real side of the model is disaggregated to allow for production of multiple goods and
services within economies; International trade in goods, services and financial assets;
(7) Full short run and long run macroeconomic closure with macro dynamics at an annual
frequency around a long run Solow/Swan/Ramsey neoclassical growth model.
(8) The model is solved for a full rational expectations equilibrium at an annual frequency
from1996 to 2070.
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good). For all regions, the internal macroeconomic structure as well as the external trade and
financial linkages are completely specified in the model. Each economy or region in the
model consists of several economic agents: households, the government, the financial sector
and the production sectors. Each of these economic actors interact in a variety of markets,
both domestic and foreign.
In summary, the model suggests that the robustness of a regional exchange rate system
depends on how common are individual country’s economic structures, policies, and internal
and external shocks. Evidence from analysis of common factors affecting real effective
exchange rates in the region, and co-integration analysis suggest that economic structures,
policies and shocks are heterogeneous. Of course, the adoption of common currency
arrangements may alter this. The robustness of such a regime also depends on a range of
political factors about which there are important questions — a common-basket peg appears to
conflict with other domestic policy objectives, it is difficult to show that countries are prepared
to make substantive policy decisions collectively rather than individually, and a common-peg
basket may not suit some countries’ strategic interests in the region.
The recommendations of the model with regard to Asia Pacific monetary union are
mixed. There are deep differences in economic structures, size and diversification of the
concerned economies. For example, the Japanese economy is much more diverse than other
Asia-Pacific economies, there are no formal fiscal transfer arrangements between these nations
and Japan — and no likelihood of them — and none of these countries has free labor mobility
with any of the other country of this region. Moreover, real exchange rates of these countries
diverge substantially from each other at times
MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS IN ASIA-PACIFIC
AND ECONOMIC STABILITY
The reason for focusing on output stability measures here is that they are linked to ulti-
mate economic objectives such as consumption. The idea that each country might place some
weight on the stability of the other country reflects the idea that the countries have been pursu-
ing closer economic ties. Here economic shocks are supposed to originate in asset markets
(monetary shocks), or in goods markets (real shocks). These shocks reflect random changes
in asset or output demands or in supplies of goods or assets. The two types of shocks occur in
each of the three concerned economies so, from the viewpoint of a particular country, and two
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possible types of random shocks can be identified each with three possible origins: real shocks:
(these occur either in one country (called an internal disturbance), or in its partner country (a
close-neighbor disturbance) or in the third country (Japan, USA) - an external disturbance) and;
monetary shocks: (these occur in one country (internal), in partner country (close-neighbor) or
in the third country (Japan, USA) and are of external nature).
In considering the impact of various monetary arrangements on stability we can then draw
on the standard Mundell (1968) assumtions on the insulation properties of alternative exchange
rate systems to determine how the respective currency arrangements will moderate effects of
various shocks. These are analyzed formally in a complete two country model by Clarke
(1979).
Monetary shocks in a small open economy fall mainly on the ‘rest of the world’ under
fixed exchange rates. The shocks have no significant effects on international interest rates so
their impact on the country releasing them is negligible.
All other factors being constant, a monetary expansion encourages an exchange
devaluation which may result in raising local output. Flexible exchange rates are relatively
less stabilizing for local real output. Relations for small economies receiving the effects of
external monetary shocks originating in large economies countries are the reverse of those just
described. Small open economies (Thailand, Malaysia) are relatively worse off in output
stability terms when external money shocks occur in a large country (for example Japan)
provided that exchange rates with the large country are fixed rather than flexible. Under fixed
exchange rates the effects of a monetary expansion in a large economy are strongly felt locally
because the induced interest rate fall is fully transmitted to the small economy. Under flexible
exchange rates however this expansionary impulse is offset by a depreciation of the large
economy’s currency and when small/medium (for example Malaysia and Thailand) country’s
income is small compared to Japan’s income the net effect of the disturbance on this country is
close to zero (Mundell, 1968). Flexible exchange rates are therefore relatively most
stabilizing for a small open economy facing external monetary shocks. Monetary close-
neighbor shocks in partner country will be most destabilizing for a given country when both
countries have a fixed exchange rate that floats against the rest-of-the-world’s currencies. A
monetary expansion in partner country will simultaneously depreciate both the both countries’
currencies against other currencies. Small/medium sized country is most protected against
such shocks in partner country when it has flexible exchange rates with each other currency.
Real demand shocks in a small open economy fall on the ‘rest of world’ under floating
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exchange rates system. An expansionary local demand shock appreciates the currency and
slowing down the expansion. Under fixed exchange rates however the real shock does not
generate this counter-balancing exchange rate adjustment. Hence flexible exchange rates are
relatively stabilizing for dealing with real shocks for the country releasing them. Fixed
exchange rates, by not enabling an offsetting exchange rate adjustment, enhance real
disturbances and hence are relatively destabilizing for the country.
Relations for small open economies receiving external real output demand shocks are the
reverse of these. Under fixed exchange rates a Japan demand expansion will stimulate
Japanese purchases of exports from a given country with such effects on this country’s
economy being offset by higher international interest rates. The net effect of this change
depends on which of these effects is stronger. Under managed floating exchange rates effects
of a hypothetical real Japanese expansion are also offset by an induced depreciation of the
Japanese yen. On the other hand no such induced offsetting effect occurring under fixed
rates. As Mundell (1969) suggested when the small country’s income is small relative to the
income of the country emitting the real shock – the effects of the disturbance go to zero.
Therefore flexible exchange rates work best at stabilizing external real shocks for a small open
economy. Real close-neighbor expansionary shocks in partner country will be most
destabilizing for small/medium economy when this shock appreciates the value of partner’s
currency – this can only occur when the exchange rate between the currencies is kept flexible.
The effects here differ from those accompanying hypothetical Japan’s real shocks because the
induced monetary effects on interest rates will be negligible when partner economy is subject
to a real shock.
Due to Asia’s diverse economic conditions and developments, a viable approach for
regional monetary integration might be to start with smaller currency areas, (clusters), and the
enlargement of these clusters at a later stage. On the basis of symmetry in macroeconomic
disturbances, geographic proximity and socio-cultural compatibility, our results suggest five
sets of country groupings as plausible candidates for potential monetary cooperation or
integration, namely: Thailand and Malaysia, Singapore and Malaysia with Brunei, Japan and
Korea, Australia and New Zealand and China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. These five groupings
also represent the Southeast region, the (sub) Northeast region, the Pacific region and the
Greater China (of the Northeast) region respectively.
The groupings of Singapore and Malaysia, and Japan and Korea respectively, is not
surprising, as Singapore and Malaysia trade heavily with one another, and Japan and Korea are
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among each other’s main trading partners. On the other hand, Hong Kong trades heavily with
China, and has exhibited a positive growth correlation with the mainland, nevertheless, both
these Chinese (very different) economies have displayed asymmetric bilateral shocks. In fact,
China has also experienced mainly idiosyncratic shocks or insignificant correlations with the
rest of the Asian economies. As such, on the basis of the significant symmetry of permanent
disturbances, the combination of Taiwan and Hong Kong, of the Greater China region, may be
a more plausible option. In general, Taiwan has also displayed a strong interrelation with the
other newly industrialized economies (NIEs) and Japan in permanent supply disturbances, and
in particular with Hong Kong
The reverse set of rankings here with respect to internal real and monetary shocks occur if
policy autonomy rather than insulation is sought. Fixed exchange rates stabilize internally
generated monetary shocks but mean monetary policy cannot be effectively used to stabilize
internal output levels. This particularly leaves a small open economy vulnerable to external
monetary shocks. Flexible exchange rates mean fiscal policy can only be less effectively used
to stabilize the economy against internal real shocks and leaves a small open economy
vulnerable to external real shocks. If efficiency of discretionary fiscal and monetary policy is
combined with the currency regime choice – the latter one will depend on which policy
instrument is regarded as most efficient. The hypothesized effects of shocks on two small
economy such as Malaysia or Thailand can be summarized as follows:
Table 2 Stability under different monetary arrangements
Close neighbour
(baht, yen, A$, S$,
  Source     Internal T$, HK$ ringitt,  External (Euro, U$)
renminbi, rupiah)
Real Largest with c Smallest with b Largest with b
Smallest with c Largest with b Smallest with c
Monetary Largest with b Smallest with c Largest with a
Smallest with b Largest with c Smallest with a or c
RELATIVE STABILITY UNDER ALTERNATIVE
MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS
Below is a short summary of the alternative monetary arrangements and their impact on
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domestic and external stability which follows the methodology proposed by Clarke (2000) for
monetary union between Australia and New Zealand.
Real internal shocks. With all other factors being constant, option (a) may destabilize
small/medium economy given real internal shocks compared to (b). Option (a) will tend
encourage to export shocks to the neighbor economy (Japan) but not to partner economy.
Option (b) tends to export them both to foreign countries. Option (c) would prevent internal
shocks from spreading outside and is least stabilizing of the three. For real internal shocks the
options are ranked in terms of independent stability as (b) > (a) > (c).
The reverse of this ranking will be sought if this economy seeks autonomous fiscal policy
rather than insulation from the effects of its own real internal shocks. Joint stability is best
pursued using (a) since this transfers the shock to the third country or neighbor country (United
States, Japan) but not to partner economy. On the other hand option (c) would prevent the
shock from expanding outside rather than allowing it to fall over the larger combined Malay-
sian and Thai economy and hence is least stabilizing. Thus the options ranked in terms of
joint stability are: (a)> (b) > (c).
Real Close-Neighbor Shocks. Option (a) would most probably insulate Malaysia from
shocks in Thailand by transferring much of the shock to the neighbour or third (Japanese, US)
economy. Option (b) will allow a shock in Thailand to be shared between all three
economies. It will be only very marginally less stabilizing than (a) given that Malaysia is
small compared to the Japanese economy. Option (c) will insulate the shock from spreading
in the economy that releases it and is most stabilizing for Malaysia. Hence if independent sta-
bility is sought then the ranking is: (c) > (a) > (b). If joint stability across the two economies
is sought then the ranking will be: (a) > (b) > (c). Since option (a) allows to transfer shock
entirely to a third country (Japan), option (b) would encourage the transfer across the two
economies and option (c) leaves it in Thailand entirely where it is highly destabilizing.
Real External Shocks. Option (a) will transfer real shocks from third country to Malaysia
and Thailand but will prevent secondary shocks in either Malaysia or third country from
impacting on the other economy. Option (c) will insulate Malaysia and Thailand from such
shocks. Finally, option (b) will transfer shocks from third country into these smaller
economies where secondary shocks in these small economies will impact on each of the other
economies. Hence if independent stability occurs the ranking is: (c)> (a) > (b). Here (c)
gives complete insulation from the external real shocks while option (a) is preferred over
option (b) since (a) prevents induced real shocks in each of the small economies from
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impacting much on the other economy. In case of option (c) the shock is restricted to the
third country while in cases of option (a) and (b) it is transferred to the smaller economies.
Option (a) is relatively most stabilizing since secondary real shocks in either small economy
are not exported to the other economy.
Monetary Internal Shocks. Option (c) will allow monetary shocks in Malaysia to fall on
Thailand and the third country. It is therefore most stabilizing for Malaysia. Option (a)
allows shocks in Malaysia to fall on the other economy but not on close neighbour (Japan). It
is second most stabilizing. Consequently, option (b) is least stabilizing. Thus the ranking in
terms of independent stability is (c ) > (a) > (b)
These rankings are reversed if national autonomy in monetary policy is sought rather than
insulation from internally-generated output shocks. In terms of joint stability option (b) will
bottle up a shock in the economy releasing it and this will be relatively destabilizing. Option
(a) will share the shock between the two small countries but not with the neighbor country
(Japan), and will therefore be more stabilizing than (b). Option (c) will export the shock to
both Thailand Japan and will be most stabilizing. Thus for joint stability the ranking is: (c) >
(a) > (b)
Monetary Close-Neighbor Shocks. An internal shock in Thailand will be kept entirely
there under option (b) so this most stabilizing for Malaysia. Under option (c) a small amount
of the disturbance will leak to Malaysia but most will go to Japan. Under option (a) the
effects of the shock is shared between the small economies with none leaking to the neighbor
economy (Japan). Thus in terms of independent stability the ranking is: (b) > (c) > (a). In
terms of joint stability the ranking is: (c) > (a) > (b) since under option (c) most of the
disturbance is transferred to Japan while under option (a) its effects are shared across the two
economies and under (b) it is restricted to Thailand where it is relatively destabilizing.
Monetary External Shocks. Option (b) limits shocks to the neighboring economy
(Japan). It is stabilizing for Malaysia. Option (a) does almost the same, and option (c) trans-
fers the monetary shock to the small economies and is least stabilizing. Hence the indepen-
dent stability ranking is (a) or b > (c).
CONCLUSIONS
With respect to the independent stability of either of the small open economies: option (a)
of monetary union does not get strong support. It is only as good as option (b) in stabilizing
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external monetary shocks and does not give good autonomy in monetary or fiscal policy
either. Option (b), the status quo, is best for real internal shocks or external/close-neighbor
monetary shocks. It enables autonomous monetary policy. Option (c), yennization, is best
for real external/close-neighbor shocks and internal monetary shocks. It enables autonomous
fiscal policy. With respect to the joint stability of both small economies; option (a) of mon-
etary union gets support with respect to real internal or close neighbor shocks and ties with (b)
for external monetary shocks; option (b), the status quo, works well for close neighbor mon-
etary shocks and ties with (a) for external monetary shocks; option (c), yennization, works well
with real external shocks and monetary internal/close-neighbor shocks.
The choice of option (c) may be rationalized in many ways. Japanese yen is the second
most traded currency in the world (BIS 2003), and so offers substantial liquidity. While the
Chinese yuan and the US dollar are also candidates, the Japanese yen is the most viable anchor
for monetary union by the Asia-pacific nations. Not only is Japan the region’s key trade
partner, but the stabilizing properties of the yen are substantially greater for commodity price
shocks than those of the yuan and the US dollar (Grimes, Holmes and Bowden 2000), and
liquidity is substantially deeper in the yen market than the yuan dollar market (de Brouwer
2001).
Japanese economy is also a good anchor country because it has a strong record of low and
stable inflation. While China’s inflation record is also good, Japan’s inflation target has been
applied more flexibly, with substantially higher and more stable output growth than China
(Grimes, Holmes and Bowden 2000; de Brouwer 2000). On the other hand there are certain
potential disadvantages of the yennization option. The first is that countries lose autonomy in
their monetary policy, although in some cases this would be an advantage (Duncan and Xu
2000). Adopting another country’s currency is also viewed as a loss of national prestige and
sovereignty. There is a well-documented tendency for people to equate sovereignty with
having a national currency (Mundell 1961), but the international debate on this issue is
changing, as evidenced not only by the euro experiences, but also by the preference of several
Latin American countries to use the US dollar and the emerging debate in Asian countries
about establishing a common currency with Japan or using the Japanese yen (Grimes, Holmes
and Bowden 2000).
One consequence of adopting another country’s currency is the loss of seignorage revenue
— the profits from printing currency — which accrue to the authorities of the issuing country;
in the case of Japan, this is the Bank of Japan (Nihon Ginko). As argued by Duncan and Xu
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(2000) and Grimes, Holmes and Bowden (2000), this can be overcome by income transfers
from Japan equal to the estimated income losses. Another consequence of adopting another
country’s currency is that the authorities are limited in their capacity to bail out their banks in
the event of a banking crisis. When the authorities do not have the ability to “print money”,
the capacity to bail out banks is limited by the currency reserve holdings of the authorities.
This is not an insurmountable problem since Asia-Pacific governments can borrow funds in
international financial markets or could form an agreement with the Japanese government for
funds to be lent at commercial rates in a crisis. Given that many banks in Asia-Pacific are
foreign owned, this may not be a critical problem.
One alternative to adopting the currency of another country is to establish a currency
board, whereby the local currency continues in circulation but its value is fixed against the
reference currency and its volume is fixed to the quantity of reserve holdings of the reference
currency. A credible currency board is self-stabilizing. If people convert the home currency
to the reserve currency, the quantity of the home currency falls which pushes up domestic
interest rates. This makes local assets more attractive and so people convert the reserve
currency back to the home currency.
A currency board has the advantage as it can eliminate some of the shocks to the exchange
rate without seeming to compromise national sovereignty since the domestic currency remains
in circulation. But it has a number of disadvantages. As is clear from the experiences of
Argentina and Hong Kong in recent years, currency boards invariably come under pressure,
and these stresses appear in the form of higher interest rates. Moreover, currency boards are
not a credible alternative for most countries since the commitment to fix the exchange rate and
back the domestic currency with reserves of the reference currency can be revoked at any
time. This is more likely to occur under crisis conditions, which is precisely the time when
credibility and stability matter.
The Asia-Pacific nations are mostly open market, small/medium undiversified economies
vulnerable to a range of shocks such as weather and crop failures, changes in foreign demand,
and domestic political uncertainty or turmoil and they trade with a varied and often
concentrated set of countries. While they have adopted a range of exchange rate regimes, it is
an arguable proposition that countries with these characteristics should use the currency of
another, bigger country, such as Japan, rather than their own. Adopting the yen would
provide a number of advantages in dealing with the vulnerabilities to which these nations’
economies are exposed. Not only would it reduce the administrative burden in these
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countries, but it would reduce the impact of social disturbances on their economies, eliminate
the difficult task of managing liquidity in their foreign exchange markets, and stabilize the
exchange rate with their most important trading partner.
The Japanese yen is the most sensible candidate to replace national currencies, given the
trade and economic linkages between these countries and Japan, the market size and stabilizing
properties of the Japanese yen, and the relatively solid performance of Japanese monetary
policy over the past decade. There is not a transitive preference ordering across the types of
disturbances even ignoring possible preferences for policy autonomy. If policy concerns are
independent then monetary union between the small economies does not make sense. It
denies monetary policy autonomy in each economy and may not stabilize either internal or
external or close neighbor real/monetary shocks better than either the current system of
managed floating.
These comments suggest a multi-speed strategy towards Asian monetary integration.
Owing to the diverse economic circumstances of this region, a practical approach towards
regional monetary integration would be to begin with smaller currency areas. We have
identified five plausible groupings of East Asian countries for potential monetary union, mainly
on the basis of their symmetry of underlying shocks, geographic proximity and possibly socio-
cultural compatibility.
The implication of this result is that the sub-regional groupings could first focus on
internal harmonization with each other, and then on external harmonization with the other sub-
regional groupings as the intermediate and longer-term strategy. In the very long run,
countries participating in the various sub-regional currency areas may even consider integrating
among themselves in forming a single currency area, once the sufficient degrees of
harmonization and convergence have been achieved. In the meantime, Asian economies
should concentrate on fostering greater economic integration through trade and investment
flows, so that the option of a single currency becomes attractive. Nevertheless, the drive
towards regional integration will depend on both economic and non-economic factors as well.
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